Points mean prizes: priority points, preferential status and directed organ donation in Israel by Antonia J Cronin
Israel Journal of
Health Policy Research
Cronin Israel Journal of Health Policy Research 2014, 3:8
http://www.ijhpr.org/content/3/1/8COMMENTARY Open AccessPoints mean prizes: priority points, preferential
status and directed organ donation in Israel
Antonia J CroninAbstract
The introduction of Israel’s new Organ Transplantation Act in 2010 has enabled the development of a unique
priority point system aimed at motivating individual’s to donate their organ. The priority point system rewards
those who are willing to donate an organ with preferential status and an increased chance of receiving a donor
organ, should they come to be in need of one. Preliminary evidence suggests it has considerable public support
among Israelis, who appear willing to redress the challenge posed by those who are willing to accept an organ but
not willing to donate. Since the Act’s introduction Israel has witnessed record numbers signing donor cards and
there has been a significant increase in the actual numbers of transplants.
One aspect of the new Israeli system that has hitherto not much been considered is its tendency towards a
communitarian model of organ donation and the implications this change in emphasis may have for the existing
‘opt-in’ model based upon autonomy and consent. Gil Siegel draws our attention to this aspect when he sets out
his defence of a proposal he refers to as ‘directed organ donation to other registered donors’, which encourages
community responsibility without affecting the established commitment to consent and individual freedom.
This commentary provides a brief overview of the new Act and its priority point system. It also examines Siegel’s
proposal and considers the implications it may have for equity and justice, personal choice and dispositional
authority. It is argued that although the proposal brings with it several inevitable hurdles for policy makers these
are not insurmountable. Rather, its extraordinary potential to save life and avoid suffering should prompt urgent
action at policy level. If such a scheme was successfully implemented in Israel it would represent a landmark
change in organ donation and allocation policy, and set an example from which we all could learn.Introduction: the Organ Transplant Act 2008
In January 2010 a new law governing organ donation
and allocation, the Organ Transplant Act 2008, came
into effect in Israel [1]. The adoption of this pioneering
Act was prompted by the shortage of organs available for
transplantation. At the time Israel’s rates of organ donation
were one of the lowest among developed countries [2].
The Act’s principal aim is to increase the number of de-
ceased donor organ donations. In order to achieve this, it
introduces a priority point system, set out at policy level,
intended to motivate individuals to donate their organs
[3]. According to the system, a person can gain priority
points by signing a donor card, making a non-directed/
non-specified organ donation during their lifetime, or as a
result of a first-degree relative signing a donor card orCorrespondence: antonia.cronin@kcl.ac.uk
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unless otherwise stated.consenting to procurement of organs after death. The
resulting tiered system includes the following: (a) max-
imum priority; (b) regular priority; and (c) second priority.
Maximum priority is granted to candidates if (a) consent
has been given for organ donation from a deceased first-
degree relative or (b) they donated a kidney, a liver lobe,
or a lung lobe in the course of their life to a non-specified
recipient. Regular priority is granted to candidates who
hold a donor card; that is, those who have consented to
donate their organs after their death. Second priority is
granted to candidates with a first-degree relative who
holds a donor card, even if they do not hold a donor card
themselves [1,3,4].
The priority point system rewards those who are will-
ing to donate an organ with preferential status and an
increased chance of receiving a donor organ, should they
come to be in need of one. The system is consistent with
the view that since the supply of donor organs has been
outstripped by demand, and they may be considered ahis is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative
ommons.org/licenses/by/4.0), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and
iginal work is properly credited. The Creative Commons Public Domain
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that those who are willing to receive an organ should also
be willing to donate one. It also redresses the perceived
unfairness of ‘free riders’ willing to receive an organ but
unwilling to donate.
The Israeli priority point system is unique. There are
aspects of the system that have been subject to criticism,
for instance the perceived unfairness of aligning the moral
good of living donation with the expression of intent to
donate. There has also been concern raised regarding the
system’s apparent failure to allocate points to living donors
who have directed their donation to a loved one, their
child say, and its potential susceptibility to strategic behav-
iour [1,4]. But, overall, the system has been remarkably
well received. As a matter of fact, since its introduction
Israel has witnessed record numbers signing donor cards
and there has been a significant increase in the actual
numbers of transplants [2,4].
Making the case for directed donation to
registered donors
One aspect of the new Israeli system that has hitherto not
much been considered is its tendency towards a commu-
nitarian model of organ donation and the implications this
change in emphasis may have for the existing ‘opt-in’
model based upon autonomy and consent.
It is this aspect that Gil Siegel draws our attention to in
his article Making the case for directed organ donation to
registered donors in Israel [5]. Siegel claims that because
the majority of the Israeli public supports organ donation
and its proven benefits, organ recovery policy should be
grounded in a strong communitarian strategy, as we all
stand to benefit from cooperation. The challenge, he says,
is to “design a policy that will increase the supply of or-
gans without significant secondary harms, such as creating
social segregation, increasing discrimination, or engaging
in unethical conducts such as coerced retrieval” [5].
By setting out empirical evidence and normative argu-
ments Siegel develops an eloquent defence of a proposal
which encourages community responsibility without af-
fecting the established commitment to consent and per-
sonal choice; he refers to the proposal as “directed organ
donation to other registered donors” (DDRD). This, he
says, is a scheme where individual preferences that pro-
mote just sharing of the burden (donating organs) as well
as the benefits (receiving an organ) of transplantation
medicine are respected. DDRD, he goes on, reinforces the
idea of ‘reciprocal altruism’ and should be understood and
portrayed as a transitional step towards a more communi-
tarian model, as a signal of solidarity by sharing organs
as a public good rather than as an exercise of a quasi-
property right. It is noteworthy that a similar scheme
has long since been promoted by a non-governmental
organization in the US, but with only limited success[6]. It is also important to differentiate DDRD from the
‘preferred status’ set out in the priority point system. In
DDRD the locus of the dispositional authority and alloca-
tion decision lies with the donor, not the official allocation
body; priority points are not the decisive factor; and the
overall benefit is collective rather than individual, insofar
as it is available to all who sign up to be donors.
Siegel’s evidence includes a report on the findings from
a detailed telephone survey, which included an assessment
of Israeli attitudes towards DDRD. Interestingly a signifi-
cant proportion (64%) of the sample felt that DDRD is jus-
tified, though remarkably, support was significantly higher
in the Arab group (84%), and lower in the ultraorthodox
Jewish group (50%). Moreover, the possibility of DDRD
had a positive effect insofar as all groups sampled reported
that the likelihood of their willingness to sign a donor card
would ‘greatly increase’ if such a scheme were in place [5].
Siegel’s normative account and the overwhelming pub-
lic support for DDRD demonstrated by the telephone
survey findings suggest, from a utilitarian perspective at
least, a ‘win win’ situation. Indeed, on the basis of survey
findings alone, one might conclude the possibility of
implementing a DDRD scheme in Israel should be taken
seriously.
However, there are two further issues that merit care-
ful consideration:
First, the dominant global trend in deceased donor organ
allocation systems is that organs should be allocated ac-
cording to principles of equity and justice, with the em-
phasis upon those with the greatest medical need. The
proposed DDRD scheme moves away from this emphasis.
If such a scheme were permissible, the principles of equity
and justice would inevitably be compromised in specific in-
stances [7,8]. Siegel considers the arguments and ethical
objections to DDRD based upon the allocation of organs
solely on objective medical criteria. One objection, Siegel
says, citing Saunders, is that such allocation “reflects a
perception of an altruistic donation and allocation sys-
tem where the donor is permitting social agents (alloca-
tion committees) to administer just distribution of a scarce
collective good” [9]. Since, the objection goes on, DDRD
introduces a motivating factor and restricts access to those
who do not participate, it could be regarded as harming al-
truism. In response to this objection, Siegel says it is almost
impossible to assess ‘altruism’ and that it is not clear that
DD is actually harming altruism [5]. But the evidence
from the telephone survey that Siegel himself presents
suggests that it is possible to provide an assessment of
altruistic voluntariness. Moreover, and contrary to his
concern, when we recall that all groups sampled re-
ported that the likelihood of their willingness to sign a
donor card would ‘greatly increase’ if such a scheme
were in place, it seems pretty clear that DDRD would
not harm it.
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What matters is fairness and equality of opportunity to
those in greatest need. The concerns of those who claim
directed donation is discriminatory and may result in social
segregation need to be taken seriously. Although Siegel’s
proposed DDRD scheme is well intended, the only way in
which policy could ensure that it would not, under any cir-
cumstances, compromise principles of equity and justice
would be to compel every one of us to register as a donor.
In that event, upon our death our organs, provided they
were suitable, would be routinely removed and put to good
use to benefit another registered donor, and so on. A policy
proposal such as this would obviate the need to rely on al-
truism with its inherent limitations, and do away com-
pletely with ‘free riders’ [10].
Such consideration leads to the second issue, which
concerns individual choice, autonomy, and dispositional
authority. As Siegel explains, individual choice and auton-
omy have come to occupy an important role in healthcare
ethics and law [5]. They take centre stage in ‘opt-in’ models
of deceased organ donation. As such, a model of organ do-
nation based upon compulsion, its good effects notwith-
standing, is highly unlikely ever to be incorporated into
policy. What we must therefore turn our attention to and
question is how an individual’s choice to donate the ‘gift of
life’ transforms into a public resource? If organs are to be
considered as public resources to be distributed by relevant
agencies, then from where did such dispositional authority
arise? Why should those who donate their organs to the
deceased donor pool not maintain the authority that enti-
tled others to remove their organs in the first place? Living
donors, in the context of a pre-existing relationship of
some kind or another, maintain such authority [7].
Siegel’s telephone survey findings set out above pro-
vide food for thought in this regard, and suggest that an
individual’s dispositional authority over their organs is
accorded considerable importance among Israelis. So, if
we continue to accede to a model of deceased organ do-
nation based upon individual choice and authorization,
we must provide good reason why such authorization does
not allow for the possibility of individual deceased donors
placing restrictions or conditions upon such authorization
before their death, including the condition that an individ-
ual’s donation is directed to another registered donor. But
Siegel’s findings go further and give us some insight into
the sorts of directedness that matter to Israelis. He reports
that 81% of those sampled (92% of Arab and 72% of ultra-
orthodox Jewish respondents) found directed donation to a
family member in need, so-called partial directed donation,
was justified [5]. What this highlights is that although
willingness to support a communitarian strategy through
directed donation is remarkably high among Israelis, will-
ingness to support family, perhaps unsurprisingly, is even
greater. Although the likelihood of an individual donatingtheir organs to a family member in the event of their death
is low, strategic policy aimed at encouraging a communitar-
ian approach to organ donation by allowing DDRD must
take this possibility into account. Moreover, if policy is seen
to encourage directedness of one sort, it must provide ro-
bust reasons for restricting directedness of other sorts, lest
the concerns of those who claim directed donation is dis-
criminatory and may result in social segregation become
ever more germane.
Conclusion
Israel’s new Organ Transplantation Act has enabled the
development of a unique priority point system aimed at
motivating individuals to donate their organs. Although
the system is not ideal and has not yet reached maturity,
it has set a remarkable precedent, and experience gained
from it will undoubtedly become a useful resource. Prelim-
inary evidence suggests it has considerable public support
among Israelis who appear willing to redress the challenge
posed by those who are willing to accept an organ but not
willing to donate.
Siegel’s DDRD proposal embraces this willingness and
encourages community responsibility without curtailing
individual freedom or liberty. Though it brings with it sev-
eral inevitable hurdles for policy makers these are not in-
surmountable. Rather, its extraordinary potential to save
life and avoid suffering should prompt urgent action at
policy level. If the DDRD scheme is successfully imple-
mented in Israel it would represent a landmark change in
organ donation and allocation policy, and set an example
from which we all could learn.
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